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Two very different pictures of mass legal consciousness1 have wide cur-
rency in contemporary legal scholarship. The first is one of public cyni-
cism, of instrumentalism without conviction, of citizens both litigious and,
at the same time, alienated from the legal system.2 This image of mass
legal consciousness informs many accounts of the so-called "litigation ex-
plosion"' and suggests that legal institutions are no longer accorded suffi-
cient legitimacy and respect. It is deployed to identify and respond to the
alleged erosion of public confidence in legal institutions.
The second view of mass legal consciousness presents a picture of a
loyal and trusting public, deeply attached to law and legal institutions,
taken in by law's manners, myths, and legitimating narratives. This por-
trait is rooted in the Tocquevillian assertion that Americans understand
their social relationships and their social problems through the lenses of
law: To resolve "their daily controversies," they "borrow . . . the ideas
and even the language peculiar to judicial proceedings." 4 Tocqueville be-
lieved that the pervasiveness of the language of law in the activities of
everyday life reflected and reinforced widespread allegiance to legal insti-
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1. Legal consciousness "includes all the ideas about the nature, function and operation of law held
by anyone in society at a given time." Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and
Empiricism, 34 STAN. L. REV. 575, 592 (1984).
2. See Glazer, Toward An Imperial Judiciary, 41 PUB. INTEREST 105 (1975); Ehrlich, Legal
Pollution, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Feb. 8, 1976, at 17-29.
3. Auerbach, A Plague of Lawyers, HARPER'S, Oct. 1976, at 37; see also Manning, Hyperlexis:
Our National Disease, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 767 (1977).
4. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 357 (F. Bowen ed. 1876).
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tutions.5 Today, a similar portrait of unquestioning public respect for the
rules and institutions of law underlies most critical scholarship.6
Specifically, critical scholarship has identified three characteristics of
mass legal consciousness which help explain the hegemony of law. First,
Americans are said to regard their legal institutions as legitimate and,
therefore, to acquiesce in the social order which those institutions help
maintain.7 Second, the legitimacy of law is said to be a product of "mysti-
fication," an illusory picture which law constructs of itself. Americans are
alleged to subscribe to myths about law produced and disseminated by
legal officials, the foremost being that law is neutral, objective, and gov-
erned by rules. The third characteristic of mass legal consciousness is said
to be the pervasive belief in the inevitability and immutability of existing
legal arrangements.' By unearthing these three elements, critics hope to
undermine what they see as excessive public respect for, and belief in, the
existing legal order.
In both pictures of mass legal consciousness lawyers are recognized as
important intermediaries between clients and the legal system;9 many
more people see lawyers than have direct contact with formal legal institu-
tions. 10 Much of the conversation between lawyers and their clients is
educational: lawyers provide knowledge of how particular legal processes
work and introduce their clients to ways the law might be used in their
favor. 1 Practicing lawyers thus play an important role in shaping mass
legal consciousness and in promoting or undermining the sense of legiti-
macy that the public attaches to legal institutions.'
Recognizing this importance, the organized bar has imposed a special
5. As Tocqueville put it, "[t]he language of the law . . . becomes, in some measure, a vulgar
tongue; the spirit of the law . . . gradually penetrates . . . into the bosom of society, where it de-
scends to the lowest classes, so that at last the whole people contract the habits and tastes of the
judicial magistrate." Id. at 358.
6. Critical scholarship on law includes a wide range of perspectives and arguments. See, e.g.,
Silbey & Sarat, Critical Traditions in Law and Society Reserach, 21 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 165 (1987);
Trubek & Esser, "Critical Empiricism" in American Legal Studies: Paradox, Program or Pan-
dora's Box, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 3 (1989). Both of these articles argue that social science re-
search on law can and should be critical of existing legal practices. However, for purposes of this
paper, we have limited our consideration to Critical Legal Studies.
7. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in POLITICS OF LAW 281 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
8. See, e.g., Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning, 3 RES. ON L. & Soc. 25 (1980).
9. The notion of lawyer as intermediary is explored by Talcott Parsons in A Sociologist Looks at
the Legal Profession, ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY (1954).
10. Miller & Sarat, Grievances, Claims and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Society, 15 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 525, 542-43 (1980-81).
11. Sarat & Felstiner, Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
93 (1986).
12. See, e.g., Brandeis, The Opportunity in Law, in BusINss-A PROFESSION (1933). Survey
research suggests that exposure to a wide variety of legal actors and institutions, including lawyers,
plays a powerful role in shaping perceptions of, and attitudes toward, law. Citizens tend to revise
views held prior to such contact and to generalize from contacts with particular parts of the legal
system in making judgments about the whole. Merry, Concepts of Law and Justice Among Working-
Class Americans, 9 LEGAL STUD. F. 59, 68-69 (1985); Sarat, Studying American Legal Culture, 11
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 427, 441 (1977).
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ethical obligation on lawyers to respect, and encourage respect for, law
and existing legal arrangements.13 Moreover, the defense of these arrange-
ments is considered essential in maintaining the authority of the legal pro-
fession itself. 4 In this sense, ethical obligation and professional self-
interest are mutually reinforcing. While critics also see a tight fit between
existing legal arrangements and the status of professionalism, they en-
courage lawyers to challenge existing arrangements and reject traditional
modes of professionalism and professional legitimation.' 5
This article focuses on the role of lawyers in the legitimation of legal
institutions. It also considers the relationship between lawyers' legitima-
tion activities and the maintenance of professional authority. In essence, it
seeks to reshape the scholarly image of mass legal consciousness by offer-
ing an empirical perspective, based on a sustained analysis of actual law-
yer/client contacts. That analysis suggests that lawyers do not, in fact,
defend the legal order. Clients are introduced to a chaotic "anti-system" in
which they cannot rely on the technical proficiency, or good faith, of
judges and rival lawyers and which they have no hope of understanding
on their own. Lawyer cynicism and pessimism about legal actors and
processes is a means through which they seek to control clients and main-
tain professional authority.
I. LEGITIMATION AND PROFESSIONALISM: A DEBATE ABOUT THE
LAWYER'S ROLE
A. The Organized Bar and the Traditional View
The role of lawyers in informing citizens about the legal process, and in
shaping perceptions and building respect for it, has been an important,
complex, and controversial issue in legal ethics. Lawyers were tradition-
13. The American Bar Association's Canons of Professional Ethics, Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, and Model Rules of Professional Conduct each contain language suggesting that law-
yers should help organize and maintain public support for and confidence in the legal system.
Canon I of the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics stated that "[it is the duty of the lawyer to
maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the
judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." The Model Code of Professional
Responsibility notes that "[w]hile a lawyer as a citizen has a right to criticize [adjudicatory officials]
publicly, he should be certain of the merit of his complaint, use appropriate language, and avoid petty
criticisms, for unrestrained and intemperate statements tend to lessen public confidence in our legal
system" (footnotes omitted). The 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct is less direct in asserting
the professional obligation of lawyers to speak and act so as to maintain public confidence in the legal
system, but the Preamble reminds lawyers that they "should demonstrate respect for the legal system
and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials." The Model Rules
contain provisions restricting attorney speech which "will have a substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding," MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 3.6
(1983), and which the lawyer "knows to be false" in regard to a judge or other "public legal officer."
Id., Rule 8.2.
14. See Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REv. 469 (1984).
15. Id.; see also Gabel & Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory
and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369 (1982-83); Simon, The Ideology of
Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 29.
1989] 1665
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 98: 1663
ally subject to disciplinary proceedings for making derogatory comments
about courts, judges, and other lawyers.'" Recently, however, there has
been a relaxation in the official strictures, giving lawyers more leeway in
what they may appropriately say about the legal order and its various
agents and officials. Disciplinary rule has, with some exceptions, become
professional admonition.'
7
In the past, the clearest restriction on attorney remarks involved public
statements made in the course of ongoing litigation; such statements could
result in contempt of court. 8 However, the bar disciplinary apparatus has
also been mobilized to sanction lawyers for unfavorable characterizations
made in the press,'" in the course of campaigns for judicial or other public
offices,20 in pleadings and briefs,2 ' and even in private correspondence be-
tween lawyers and judges.22
Some scholars believe that despite occasional disciplinary proceedings
against those who criticize legal processes or officials, lawyers generally
16. See infra notes 19-22; see also Annotation, Attorney's Criticism ofJudicial Acts as Grounds
of Disciplinary Action, 12 A.L.R. 3d 1408 (1967).
17. See supra note 13.
18. See cases cited in Annotation, supra note 16, at 1418-27.
19. See State v. Nelson, 210 Kan. 637, 504 P.2d 211 (1972); Justices of the Appellate Div. v.
Erdmann, 39 A.D. 2d 233, 333 N.Y.S. 2d 863 (1972), rev'd, 301 N.E.2d 426, 33 N.Y. 2d 559, 347
N.Y.S.2d 441 (1973).
20. See, e.g., Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Michaelis, 210 Neb. 545, 316 N.W.2d 46 (1982).
21. In papers filed in a federal district court, the defendant's attorney stated that:
the state trial judge avoided the performance of his sworn duty. To repeat a time worn
phrase-you cannot get justice in a state court where the judge is a product of the
prosecutorial system which aided dramatically in elevating him to the bench. A product of that
system who works close (sic) with the Sheriffs and who must depend on political support and
re-election to the bench is not going to do justice.
His reprimand was upheld, by a county court, in In re Shimek, 284 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 1973).
22. See In re Chapak, 66 F. Supp. 265 (E.D.N.Y. 1946). In 1985, the United States Supreme
Court overturned a disciplinary sanction which had been imposed on the basis of remarks and criti-
cisms contained in a letter written by an attorney to the secretary of a district court judge. See In re
Snyder, 472 U.S. 634 (1985).
Courts asked to enforce or review such disciplinary efforts have recognized, in dicta, the potential
conflict between first amendment guarantees and bar disciplinary codes. In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622
(1959). Partly as a result of this conflict, courts have reached widely divergent results in trying to
decide whether to impose sanctions where attorneys have made public criticisms of judges. For cases
where sanctions were imposed or upheld, see Eisenberg v. Boardman, 302 F. Supp. 1360 (W.D. Wis.
1969) (attorney circulated statement designed to humiliate judge); In re Lacy, 283 N.W.2d 250, 251
(S.D. 1979) (attorney quoted in press as saying "state courts were incompetent and sometimes down-
right crooked"); In re Raggio, 87 Nev. 369, 487 P.2d 499 (1970) (attorney wrote magazine article
criticizing judges in intemperate terms); see also In re Friedland, 268 Ind. 536, 376 N.E.2d 1126
(1978) (attorney suspended for referring to paternity hearing as "ordeal," "travesty," and "the biggest
farce I've ever seen"); In re Paulsrude, 311 Minn. 303, 248 N.W.2d 747 (1979) (attorney disbarred
for in-court remarks, which included calling judge a "horse's ass" after an adverse ruling and label-
ling the proceedings a "kangaroo court"). For cases not disciplining attorneys for criticizing judges,
see, e.g., State v. Nelson, 210 Kan. 637, 504 P.2d 211 (1972) (no discipline imposed where attorney
made only general accusations and was speaking as losing party in litigation); Justices of Appellate
Div. v. Erdmann, 33 N.Y.2d 559, 301 N.E.2d 426, 347 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1973) (attorney not subject to
discipline even though he called appellate judges "whores who become madams," and claimed that the
only way to become a judge was "to be in politics or to buy it"); State Bar v. Semann, 508 S.W.2d
429 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (no discipline imposed against attorney who wrote letters to newspapers
critical of judge's qualifications to hold office).
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act as apologists for existing legal arrangements.23 Lawyers' activities, eth-
ics, and understandings of appropriate professional roles are thought to
reflect the legitimating assumptions of the legal system. In this view, one
would expect lawyers to communicate to their clients a traditional picture
of law-one that differentiates law and power, that emphasizes the deter-
minacy of legal rules, the objectivity of legal decision-making, and the
fairness of legal judgments.24
Such a picture would not only legitimate existing legal arrangements,
but would also provide an account of, and a justification for, the profes-
sional authority with which lawyers are vested. Given this view, the au-
thority of lawyers can be derived from both their specialized knowledge
and their commitment to disinterested client service.2 5 Legal problems are
understood to be technical,26 and clients on their own are assumed not to
have sufficient knowledge to cope adequately with them.2 7 When lawyers
articulate the legitimating assumptions of law, they portray success in the
legal system as dependent upon expert knowledge and the shrewd applica-
tion of legal rules. What the client buys when he gets legal help is some of
that expert knowledge.
B. The Critical View
Critical scholarship starts with the same picture embraced by the or-
ganized bar: it assumes that lawyers present and defend a traditional un-
derstanding of law when they speak to their clients.2" Critics argue, how-
23. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise 1870-1920,
in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70, 110 (G. Geison ed. 1984). Gordon
argues that "when a lawyer helps a client arrange a transaction so as to take maximum advantage of
the current legal framework, he or she becomes one of the army of agents who confirm that frame-
work by reinforcement."
24. From this perspective law is a rule system: Rules determine how law operates, how legal
procedures work, and how legal decisions are made. Rules also insure that the legal process will be
orderly, regular and predictable, and that legal decisions will be made impartially, fairly, and in a
non-arbitrary fashion. In short, rules determine the ability of law to regulate the social order.
Reflecting these assumptions, formalist discourse portrays individual legal actors as highly con-
strained by a regimen of clearly articulated rules; rules matter, people do not. Discretion is, in this
discourse, minimal and inconsequential. As Dicey argued, rules insure "the absolute supremacy or
predominance of regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power, and exclude the existence
of arbitrariness, or prerogative, or even of wide discretionary authority." A. DiCEY, INTRODUCTION
TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 202 (9th ed. 1939).
The idea that rules can and should constrain the choices made by legal decision-makers is seen in
many different theories of judicial decision-making. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERI-
OUSLY (1977); H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). For a treatment of these themes in the
context of lawyer/client relations, see A. SARAT & W. FELSTINER, LEGAL REALISM IN LAWYER-
CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS 4-8 (American Bar Foundation, Working Paper No. 8723 (1987)).
25. For a general statement of the relationship between professional authority on the one hand,
and specialized knowledge and professional ethics on the other, see A. CARR-SAUNDERS, PROFES-
SIONS: THEIR ORGANIZATION AND PLACE IN SOCIETY (1928); see also W. MOORE, THE PROFES-
SIONS (1970); E. SCHEIN, PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION: SOME NEW DIRECTIONS (1973).
26. The full implications of this position are explored by D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT:
WHO'S IN CHARGE? 7-28 (1974).
27. See Moore & Tumin, Some Social Functions of Ignorance, 14 Am. Soc. REv. 789 (1949).
28. Simon, supra note 14.
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ever, that lawyers should not do so. Instead they want lawyers to help
demystify the law and, in so doing, to undermine the legitimacy of ex-
isting legal arrangements.29 Yet critical scholarship has, for the most part,
failed to carefully examine the actual behavior of lawyers."0 Like most
legal academics, critics concentrate on interpreting legal doctrine to expose
"legal formalism" as an empty legitimating myth and to indict judges as
purveyors of that myth." They assume that lawyers play a similar role. 2
While they seek to uncover complexity and contradiction in doctrine, crit-
ics act as if the legitimating messages communicated at different locations
and by different actors within the legal system are consistent.
Critical scholars want lawyers to demystify and delegitimate law by
exposing the inconsistency and arbitrariness of legal doctrine to their cli-
ents.33 They want lawyers to teach clients that rules are used by legal
officials as instruments to achieve personal and political purposes or as
post hoc rationalizations.3 4 Rights and responsibilities cannot be deduced
from pre-existing rules because rules are so numerous, complicated, and
ambiguous that they can accommodate almost any result. In short, critics
want lawyers to help politicize mass legal consciousness. 5
The replacement of legal formalism with a less rule-centered portrait of
law is part of the effort of critical scholars to reform lawyer/client rela-
tions and to provide an alternative to traditional understandings of profes-
sionalism and professional power.36 Critical scholars assume that under-
mining formalism will contribute to the reorganization and reorientation
of the legal profession. Stripped of the illusion of rule determinacy, clients
will demand a more active role in the management of their own legal
problems; lawyers will be free to come to terms with the constitutive ef-
fects of their activities, and, finally, lawyers and clients working together
can break down the artificial boundaries separating law and politics. 3 As
Gabel and Harris put it, lawyers should demystify the law and help their
clients to "reconceptualize the way the legal system itself is organized."38
29. Gabel & Harris, supra note 15.
30. For an exception, see Gordon, supra note 23.
31. See Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985);
Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REv. 591 (1981);
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1975).
32. Simon, supra note 14.
33. Id.; see also Gabel & Harris, supra note 15.
34. Gabel & Harris, supra note 15.
35. Simon, supra note 14.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Gabel & Harris, supra note 15, at 376.
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II. THE EMPIRICAL PROJECT
A. Methods
Whether the assumptions of the organized bar or of the critics bear any
relationship to actual legal practice is currently unknown. To develop a
clear understanding of lawyers' contributions to the maintenance or cri-
tique of legal legitimacy, and to assess the implications of what lawyers
actually tell their clients about the legal process for a theory of mass legal
consciousness and professional authority, we conducted an observational
study of lawyer/client conferences.3 9 Over a period of 33 months, we ob-
served and tape-recorded 115 lawyer/client conferences in California and
in Massachusetts.4 ° This effort consisted of following one side of 40 di-
vorce cases, involving 20 different lawyers, ideally from the first lawyer/
client interview until the divorce was final.
We chose to examine divorce, in part, for tactical reasons.4 Divorce,
39. Our interest in law talk and its consequences is part of a larger project on lawyer/client
relations and the dynamics of professional authority. In addition to the analysis of law talk, we have
examined the way lawyers and clients negotiate the meaning of the social relations and behavior
involved in marital breakup and in the legal process of divorce. See Sarat & Felstiner, Law and Social
Relations: Vocabularies of Motive in Lawyerl Client Interaction, 22 LAW & Soc'y REV. 737 (1988).
In that paper we drew upon Mills' analysis of vocabularies of motive, see Mills, Situated Action and
Vocabularies of Motive, 5 Am. Soc. REV. 904 (1940), to show how lawyers and clients bring different
agendas and views of the social world to their interactions. While clients are very interested in recon-
structing the past and in assigning guilt and blame, lawyers generally avoid being drawn into such
reconstructions. They interpret behavior in situational terms and, in so doing, limit their social comm-
mentary by focusing on the way the divorce process works and on how it shapes the actions of divorc-
ing spouses.
Both law talk and the negotiation of the meaning of social relations and behavior are, in our view,
linked to the process of moving cases toward settlement. Contrary to some images in popular culture,
the divorce lawyers we observed are overwhelmingly pro-settlement. See A. Sarat & W. Felstiner,
Selling Settlement: Lawyers, Clients and the 'World of Deals' [hereinafter Selling Settlement] (un-
published manuscript on file with authors). By refusing to participate in blaming and fault-finding,
lawyers work to defuse client anger. Indeed, they often explicitly instruct clients that their anger must
be put aside if they are to reach satisfactory settlements. In this way, lawyers try to substitute ration-
ality and economic calculation for emotionalism. Moreover, by undermining client confidence in the
rationality and predictability of the legal system, lawyers try to convince clients that it is better to try
to negotiate a resolution to their divorce dispute. For a discussion of the relationship among law talk,
talk about social relations, and the disposition process in the context of a single case, see Sarat &
Felstiner, supra note 11.
40. Massachusetts and California were chosen as research sites because they represent very differ-
ent legal cultures and because their respective rules governing divorce are substantially different.
41. While observational research of the kind reported below has proven valuable in other areas,
see Maynard, The Structure of Discourse in Misdemeanor Plea Bargaining, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
74 (1984); O'Barr & Conley, Litigant Satisfaction Versus Legal Adequacy in Small Claims Narra-
tives, 19 LAW & Soc'y REV. 661 (1985), there have been few published reports of observational
studies of lawyer/client interaction. See Cain, The General Practice Lawyer and the Client: Towards
a Radical Conception, 7 INT'L J. Soc. L. 331 (1979); Hosticka, We Don't Care About What Hap-
pened, We Only Care About What Is Going to Happen: Lawyer-Client Negotiations of Reality, 26
Soc. PROB. 599 (1979).
There have, in fact, been no previous empirical examinations of law talk in the lawyer's office.
Some have argued that such research could not be carried out. D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 26, at
179-80 (suggesting impossibility of overcoming privilege problem); Danet, Hoffman & Kermish, Ob-
stacles to the Study of LawyerlClient Interaction: The Biography of a Failure, 14 LAW & Soc'Y
REV. 905 (1980) (reporting failure of effort to observe lawyer/client conferences in Boston).
Because divorce is an area in which the activities of lawyers have been particularly controversial
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however, is by no means typical of all areas of practice. Thus the general-
izations that can be drawn from this data may be limited. Nonetheless,
our findings are highly consequential, given the prevalence of divorce and
the fact that it is one of the areas of most frequent contact between citi-
zens and the legal system.42
B. The Data
Conversations between lawyers and clients are frequently about the na-
ture, operation, and efficacy of legal institutions and the characteristics,
motivation, and competence of legal actors. They range from perfunctory
recitation of rules governing the divorce process to complicated explana-
tions of particular results. While discussions of the legal system-what we
call law talk-are spread throughout our sample of lawyer/client confer-
ences, they are not spread evenly. Law talk tends to occur when prompted
by significant events in the course of litigation. It is, in addition, more
likely to be initiated by a client inquiry than volunteered by a lawyer.
Finally, what is perhaps most striking is the relative uniformity in law
talk among the many different kinds of lawyers in our sample. Differ-
ences in experience, type of practice, and degree of specialization are not
associated with differences in the picture of law presented in the divorce
lawyer's office.43 Moreover, despite important differences in legal culture
and the rules governing divorce, there are no significant differences in the
frequency, range, or pattern of law talk in Massachusetts and California.
and because recent reform efforts have aimed to limit the lawyer's role, we expected that research on
lawyer/client interaction in divorce would encounter less resistance than in other areas of legal prac-
tice. Lay notions of research are that it is an activity intended to solve problems. It was thus crucial in
securing cooperation to be able to describe a problem that lay people can understand and a way in
which the proposed research can have an effect on that problem. There is such general skepticism
about the American divorce process that many of the lawyers and clients that we approached immedi-
ately appreciated the relevance of the research.
The lawyer samples have two obvious biases. In both sites they involve a higher proportion of
women than exists either in the bar or among divorce lawyers generally. Nevertheless, the samples
contain more male than female lawyers. More importantly, the samples appear not to include many
lawyers high in income, experience, and status; relatively few represented doctors, lawyers, business-
men, or others with substantial income and assets. As a general matter, these lawyers also attended
less prestigious law schools than the lawyers considered to be at the top of local divorce practice. Thus
the findings of this project should not be considered representative of all divorce lawyers. However,
other than their relative status within the local bar, we know of no other relevant trait on which these
lawyers are different from the rest of the divorce bar, and consider it fair to say that the findings do
originate with a sample that is characteristic of lawyers that most people with ordinary financial
resources are likely to consult.
42. See B. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC 103-04 (1974). It is estimated that
during the period from March 1987 to March 1988 1,167,000 couples were divorced. THE WORLD
ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1989 806 (1989).
43. We have not yet systematically examined the data for gender differences nor at this point do
we expect gender to play a significant role in explaining the kind of law talk discussed in this paper.
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1. The Significance of Rules
How do lawyers describe the law, particular laws, or legal processes to
their clients? What characteristics are attributed to law and the legal sys-
tem? Before addressing these questions it is important to note that there is
a rather regular progression in law talk-a constant narrative structure.
Almost all divorce cases start with the lawyer's brief explanation of di-
vorce procedures as they are laid out in statutes."' This law talk is full of
explicit references to rules. Lawyers begin, if you will, with formalism.
They describe the rules that frame the process, establish its limits and
provide alternative routes. However, the written law is only a starting
point. Formalism fades rather quickly as the interaction progresses. De-
scriptions and characterizations of the legal system now occur mainly
when clients ask why a particular result occurred or what results might be
predicted. In response to these unsolicited inquiries, lawyers rarely make
explicit reference to rules.45 Rules and their relevance are taken for
granted by lawyers who generally act as if clients already shared their
empirical understanding of the legal process. As a consequence, at this
point in the interaction, lawyers do not take the time to introduce their
clients to the subtle manner in which rules penetrate and permeate the
legal process.
Lawyers often talk about what can or cannot be done or what is or is
not likely to happen without explicitly noting that their views are shaped
by statutes or court decisions, although the trained ear would recognize
that their formulations are clearly rooted in an understanding of rules.
Typical of such implicit rule references is the response of a lawyer to a
44. Such explanations are almost always provided in the first conference and are quite formulaic.
In Massachusetts, the perfunctory run-through of the statutory parameters of the legal process of
divorce is usually the preface to a discussion of whether the divorce will be filed, or counterfiled, on
fault or no-fault grounds.
45. While this is generally true even when clients ask what the law is in relation to some particu-
lar topic, there are rare exceptions. In one Massachusetts case, for example, the client asked whether
it mattered that the marital home was in her husband's name. Her lawyer answered by saying:
There's a real neat case. . . I don't know if it's real neat . . . some divorce lawyers are really
horrified by Rice v. Rice which says . . . equitable . . . first one that made it clear that it
didn't matter whose name ...
A similarly unusual reference occurred in a California case where a client asked whether she would
be able to stay in the marital home after the divorce. To this her lawyer noted:
There is a famous case called the Duke case. You don't need to know all the details now, but
the Duke case-that's why we have a phrase in law called 'they duked it out'-the Duke case
basically said that Mrs. Duke, who was in very bad economic shape,. . . it dealt with her
ability to stay in the house. And so, we now know that a judge has the discretion literally to
say to your husband, 'I understand that you own half the house, but I'm not going to order
this lady out. .. '
In two specific contexts, the presence of rules tends to be made explicit on a more regular basis.
The first is the rules concerning community property in California. In these discussions community
property is not defined in any precise terms but seems to have become a folk term. It is used in the
same way that "visitation" or "custody" is used. The second area in which explicit reference to rules
is common is in conversations about the tax consequences of divorce, property division and alimony or
child support. Client questions about what such events will mean to the Internal Revenue Service are
often met with an explicit reference to some rule or provision of the tax code.
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client's inquiry about what would happen to child support if his income
were reduced:
You should keep in the back of your mind. . that if your financial
situation changes in the future the judgment can be modified. That's
not a problem. It is not etched in stone. . . .Anything to do with a
child is always modifiable by the court.
How and why judgments in court "can be modified" is not explained.
The client is not told whether that possibility is a result of the ease with
which lawyers escape from earlier agreements, or of the sympathy that
judges display toward children, or of the rules governing support, custody,
and visitation. This failure to identify rules and highlight their relevance
prevents clients from having access to law's public discourse and the re-
sources for argument provided by an understanding of rules. In addition,
it helps lawyers maintain a monopoly of those resources and focuses client
concerns on the professional skills and capacities of their particular
lawyer.
Lawyers, in fact, talk to clients in much the same way that they talk to
each other.46 There is no acknowledgement that clients may not already
understand the salience of rules. The normal conventions of lawyer-to-
lawyer discourse are not translated for divorce clients, who most often
bring an incomplete and unsophisticated understanding to their en-
counters with the legal process. There is no concerted effort to bridge the
gap between professional and popular culture.
Even when rules are explicitly noted, there are few references to or
discussions of their determinate power. Lawyers do not describe the legal
process of divorce as rule driven or rule governed. Nor do they usually
provide an explicit evaluation of the rules themselves. However, when
rules do at times emerge as part of the explicit conversational foreground,
they are generally disparaged; contrary to the assumptions of both the
organized bar and critical scholars, lawyers rarely defend the rationality,
importance, or efficacy of legal rules.
For instance, it is common for lawyers to mock rules as irrelevant or
useless in governing the behavior of legal officials involved in the divorce
process. Rules, according to one California lawyer, do not give "clear-cut
46. Our research included frequent observations of lawyer-to-lawyer talk in the hallways and
conference rooms of courts as well as observations of such talk in more informal settings. For similar
conclusions about lawyer-to-lawyer talk, see M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS Is THE PUNISHMENT: HAN-
DLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT ch. 6 (1979) and L. MATHER, PLEA BARGAINING OR
TRIAL? ch. 6 (1979).
As insiders, what is of interest to lawyers is the way rules are manipulated by the people they deal
with every day. Their code, their standard way of thinking about the legal process, would be unintel-
ligible without rules; it is, however, a code in which rules operate in the background, so that in
practice calculations and decisions are made without explicit rule references. When they talk with
their clients lawyers begin, if you will, in the middle.
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answers. If they did we wouldn't even have to be talking." A Massachu-
setts lawyer spoke more generally about the irrelevance of rules in
describing the way the local court system operated: "There really are no
rules here, just people, the judge, the lawyers, the litigants." Another
maintained that the scheduling of cases reflected the virtually unchecked
power of the bailiff:
When you get heard is up to the court officer. . . he's the one who
controls the docket. They don't have a list prepared and they don't
start at the top and work down. They go according to his idea of
when people should be heard.
Other lawyers extended the argument about the ambiguity or irrele-
vance of rules to more important aspects of the legal process of divorce.
Several suggested that judges refuse to be guided by rules of evidence and
that such rules therefore have no bearing on the way hearings are con-
ducted."1 One Massachusetts lawyer explained that he would not be able
to prevent the opposing spouse from talking about his client's alleged
adultery even though such testimony would be technically inadmissible
according to the literal rules:
I think we just have to realize that it is going to come out. We just
have to take that as a given. You know, they teach you in law school
about how to object to that kind of testimony: 'I object, irrelevant,' 'I
object hearsay.' But then when you start to practice you realize that
judges, especially in divorce cases, don't pay any attention. They act
as if there were no rules of evidence.
Other lawyers expressed frustration about the ineffectiveness of rules gov-
erning filing periods, establishing times in which responsive pleadings are
to be submitted or governing the conduct of discovery.
Moreover, statutes concerning property division are, as lawyers tell it,
often irrelevant to actual outcomes. Lawyers in both Massachusetts and
California regularly criticized judges for failing to pay attention to those
statutes or to the case law interpreting them. As one Massachusetts law-
yer told her client in a case involving substantial marital property,
[iun this state the statute requires judges to consider fifteen separate
things, things like how long you were married, what contributions
you and Tom made, whether you have good prospects. It is a pretty
comprehensive list, but I've never seen a judge make findings on all
of those things. They just hear a few and then divide things up.
47. Lawyers do not explain the special concern for guiding lay juries that accounts for particular
rules of evidence. As a result, they do not suggest that judicial "flexibility" is appropriate or
understandable.
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Things generally come out roughly even, but not because the rules
require it.
Thus, what lawyers do make visible as they respond to their clients'
questions are the personalities and dispositions of actors within the legal
process and the salience of local norms rather than legal rules. Emphasiz-
ing people over rules, law talk acquaints clients with a process in which
judges exercise immense discretionary power."" The message to the client
is that it is the judge, not the rules, that really counts. What the judge will
accept, what the judge will do is the crucial issue in the divorce process.
With respect to property settlements, Massachusetts clients are reminded
that since all agreements require judicial approval there is, in effect,
"nothing binding about them. The judge will do what he wants with it."
Another lawyer explained that in dividing the marital property, "the
judge can do with it as he chooses to do." Still another lawyer informed
his client of what he called the "immense amount of power and authority"
which judges exercise and suggested that the particular judge who would
be hearing his case would use that power "pretty much as he deems fit."
A second way in which lawyers denigrate rules is by characterizing
them as unnecessarily technical. They claim that, as a result, even judges
and lawyers frequently do not know what they mean. For example:
Client: Tell me the mechanics of this.
Lawyer: You should know. It's your right to know. But whether or
not I'm going to be able to explain this is questionable. . . . It's sort
of simple in practice, but its very confusing to explain. I've an awful
lot of really smart people who've . . . who've asked me after the
divorce is over, now what the hell was the interlocutory judgment?
A third criticism of rules focuses on their weakness in guiding or deter-
mining behavior outside the legal process. Lawyers identify the limits of
law."' They acquaint their clients with the limited efficacy of legal rules
and caution them not to rely too heavily on rules or court orders. This is
particularly the case when a lawyer is trying to discourage his client from
pursuing a certain course of action. Thus, in one California case, where
the client was very disturbed by her husband's continuing refusal to obey
a restraining order [restricting contact with the spouse], the lawyer's re-
48. The thoughtful client may also realize that lawyers, in what they choose to say about rules
and judges, also exercise immense discretionary power.
49. There is, of course, another message which might be discerned if one were to focus on the
frequency with which lawyers implicitly make reference to rules. In those instances, lawyers seldom
speak about the efficacy of law or rules. Nevertheless, the way they talk suggests that this silence is a
function not of cynicism about rules but of the pervasive way that rules are interwoven into lawyers'
thinking about divorce. However, given the ambiguity that arises from the gap between the taken-for-
grantedness of rules in the thinking of lawyers and their explicit critique of particular rules in talking
to clients, clients are likely to come away with a view about the relevance of rules in the divorce
process that is very different from their lawyer's actual perspective.
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sponse was to stress the futility of going to court to obtain a contempt
order:
Lawyer: Okay. So what you would like is what? You'd like phone
calls if he need to . . .
Client: Limited to the concern of the children or medical bills, and,
you know, never mind giving me all his heartache trouble.
Lawyer: You know, he's in violation of the court order [restricting
contact with the spouse], but to take him to court, it can be done, I'm
not saying that we won't do it or anything, it's a matter of proving
contempt. We can prove it, but then what do you get out of that.
You don't get anything ...
"You don't get anything" suggests that since rules and orders are not self-
executing, they do not necessarily govern behavior or resolve problems.
This lawyer is schooling his client in what has been called the "gap"
problem, the extremely loose coupling between legal rules and social
behavior.50
The same emphasis on the limited efficacy of rules is conveyed in the
following discussion of joint legal custody, where a Massachusetts lawyer
talks to his client about the irrelevance of joint legal custody. The client
brings substantial preconceptions about the meaning of joint custody to
this exchange. The lawyer's effort is to disabuse him of those preconcep-
tions, to emphasize that what matters is the ongoing relationship between
spouses rather than the posture of official arrangements:
Client: The custody order I would like to be requested is joint cus-
tody. That means, and correct me if I'm wrong, that I shall be aware
and informed and be able to have input in my daughter's life as well
as she would have the right to be aware, informed and have input in
my daughter's life whether my daughter is there with her or here
with me.
Lawyer: There's no such thing as court ordered joint custody. In a
realistic sense, real sense of joint custody. You are thinking of it as if
there is. Just like it's a court ordered step. You get custody and she
has visitation rights. That means definite things. You have the cus-
tody and you control the child's life: She becomes a visitor. On joint
custody that's something that is worked out between the two individ-
uals who right from the start are able to deal with the child with at
least no major problems. They would deal with the child in a normal
manner. . ..
This lawyer's comparison of court orders and what really happens sug-
gests a parallel between the ineffectiveness of rules governing the behavior
50. See Abel, Law Books and Books About Law, 26 STAN. L. REV. 175, 184 (1973); see also
Sarat, Legal Effectiveness and Social Studies of Law, 9 LEGAL STUD. F. 23 (1985).
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of those who are part of the legal apparatus-lawyers, court officers,
judges-and the limited power of rules to control the behavior of people
outside the legal process.5'
2. The Critique of Legal Officials
When attention is turned from assessment of rules to evaluation of the
behavior of actors in the legal process, lawyers continue their law talk in a
critical, realistic mode. In their characterizations of judges, lawyers tend to
think in comparative terms, often noting that different judges react differ-
ently to similar combinations of facts and rules. Thus law talk turns dis-
cretion into difference. The legal process is said to individualize results,
not on the basis of the idiosyncratic fact patterns or the litigants' particu-
lar needs, but as a reflection of the propensities of the individual judge. In
one case, for example, the lawyer suggested that he might have difficulty
getting the judge to accept a particularly favorable division of property. As
he explained,
[s]ome judges wouldn't care. I could do it by representation. Just
present the papers to the judge, tell him what we've done, and he'd
shake his head and go okay, and sign an order and we'd be all done.
Okay. Judge Max doesn't let that happen. . . . Other judges, ex-
cuse me, most other judges, would not even ask questions other than
saying something like 'Are you satisfied?' But this judge . . . will
very likely want to ask her if she indeed understood the agreement
before she signed it and he'll want to run through the thing.
As another lawyer put it, "[t]here are no 'for sures,' you are dealing with
the antithesis of science . . . at the other end, with opinion, viewpoint."
While some judges are considered better than others, and better judges
are deemed "smart" or "experienced" or "savvy" or "reasonable," the
clear tendency of lawyers' talk about judges is to call into question their
skill, dedication, and concern. In the lawyers' vocabulary, no word is more
prominent in describing judges than "arbitrary." Judges are portrayed in
ways that suggest that they are capable of making decisions on grounds
that have nothing to do with facts or rules. As one Massachusetts lawyer
said in explaining to his client what to expect in a hearing, "[y]ou have to
be careful in terms of how you do certain things because you can really
prejudice the judge against you by bringing up certain issues in a certain
way."
51. It is not surprising that divorce lawyers de-emphasize rules. The rules in divorce typically
invite a high level of discretion, and issues often become matters of individual equity rather than
formalized rules. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 43 (1972) (discretion plays significant role
in equity).
1676 [Vol. 98: 1663
Lawyers and Legal Consciousness
In another conversation, a lawyer encouraged his client to adopt a par-
ticular demeanor in the courtroom:
Lawyer: But you sit there somewhat respectful. Do the same thing
in this courtroom, okay? Hands in front of you are just fine, or on
the table just fine. I don't care, but don't cross your legs.
Client: (Crosses legs)
Lawyer: Okay. I asked you not to do that. If you do it I'll probably
nudge you in the shoulder and ask you to stop crossing your legs.
Okay? No arms over the back of the chair. Okay?
Client: (Sits up very straight)
Lawyer: That's alright. You look nice and neat and scared that way,
that's okay. But sit up with your arms and hands in front of you; I
don't care where they go, but in front of you, and without the
crossed legs. Okay? And then one other thing I ask of you. Don't go
like this (puts head on his desk), or anything, but don't go like this.
Okay? No matter how tired you are tomorrow morning I want you
to look pretty alert. It's best if you can just remember to keep your
hands on the table or in your lap, and you'll be all set. Okay? Why?
Why am I asking you to do this? Only because the judge will be
looking at you. Okay? And he's going to make a decision, a fairly
important one, and I don't want that decision to be influenced just
by the way you sit.
Client: Like, he don't care.
Lawyer: Well, he might, if he doesn't like you. Okay? And even if
he doesn't like you but you look concerned and you're interested,
he'll probably go your way anyway. Okay. Judges are people, and
well, I'll tell you, we might as well play the odds rather than have
some surprises develop just because the judge doesn't like the way
you're sitting. Okay?
Client: Some would do that?
Lawyer: Yup, some do.
In explaining why he must talk about such things as posture and ap-
pearance, this lawyer is guarding against the possibility that the judge's
decision may be "influenced just by the way you sit." While this is an
extreme case, law talk is peppered with references to extra-legal factors
that influence judges, including their backgrounds and experiences. Thus
one lawyer cautioned a female client that her chances of arranging joint
custody for her child were not great because
[j]udges don't have a real good sense of what to do about this. . ..
It is a very male dominated view, because most of the judges are in
the 40s and 50s or over and the concept anybody would. . .They
find it hard in their own experience to digest the notion. . .In their
day, when they were practicing lawyers, you either get custody or
you don't. So they don't quite know what to do with joint custody.
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While judges are influenced by minute details of client dress and behav-
ior in the courtroom, they are also alleged to be incapable of grasping the
nuances and subtleties of legal arguments, uninterested in the details of
particular cases, and to act in ways that make their decisions difficult to
understand. As one Massachusetts lawyer said in explaining a judge's
ruling:
I don't think he's totally oblivious to some of the more obvious
things. The more subtle things I'm not sure he's catching on to. And
he's not exercising his authority to allow us to delve into a lot of the
more subtle things. Perhaps the judge doesn't want to rule on the
motion for sanctions because he wants you to get your evidence in
• ..okay . . . and because he wants to hear enough so that he can
grant you your divorce . . . there is the possibility . . . that he can
see at least the obvious things down below him and those are enough
for him. And that he doesn't care about the subtleties and that those
things that are so obvious to him are all he needs and he wants to
give you . . . what we want to obtain. Now that's a possibility, and
we shouldn't discount it yet. . . .However . . .as much as I hope
and pray that that's just what he's doing I'm not all that optimistic
on it either. And I wouldn't guess that he was doing that based on
the reputations developed among other. . . attorneys. Based on that
reputation I have my doubts that he is that bright . ..he's that
aware of what's going on. But if he is we should be aware that he
might be.
This lawyer's critique is doubled in the rhetorical play of the words obvi-
ous and oblivious. At the same time, the general criticism is softened by
the suggestion that the judge's limitations may work, in this case, to the
client's advantage.
In other cases, judges are said to lack the requisite qualifications or
knowledge to make the decisions that the law requires them to make. As
one California lawyer put it, in explaining why he was not optimistic
about a favorable ruling on a complicated property issue, "[y]ou've got a
judge with a 110 IQ who is sitting there, and he says, 'Hey, I don't want
to hear all the god damned complications. . .Let's do it the simplest
way.'" Or as another lawyer suggested:
[h]ere's the problem. . . .What they really ought to do in domestic
law is every judge who hears domestic law ought to have, literally a
CPA, or somebody familiar with financial data, prepare for him or
her something before the case to say somehow there is magic going
on here. ... [Judges] don't think even logically to say where's the
money going to come from.
Criticism of judges does not end with issues of competence and qualifi-
cation; it also includes issues of motivation, sensitivity, and concern. Many
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judges are said to be lazy, insensitive, concerned more with their own con-
venience than with the issues, and generally uninterested in "justice." As
one lawyer put it, they "don't want to make tough decisions." Another
suggested that
[j]udges are not tolerant of subtleties. . . . All they want you to do
is, they want you out the door and the rulings are usually gross.
They're gross rulings. They don't consider and factor in the subtle-
ties of what the people are trying to do.
The talk of this and other lawyers indicates that the ease of making deci-
sions is a major influence on the judiciary.52 It suggests that the inatten-
tiveness, insensitivity, and incompetence of judges must be taken into ac-
count in deciding how to process cases. As one lawyer says, "whatever
arbitration system you choose is better than the judge."
These explanations describe the legal system as idiosyncratic and per-
sonalistic, and, in so doing, they endow lawyers with a mystique of insider
knowledge and experience that is unavailable to even well-educated, well-
read clients. They suggest that the skilled lawyer is more than a good
legal technician; he is someone who knows the back corridors of legal in-
stitutions, the personalities of judges and how to present client desires in
such a way as to appeal to the judges' proclivities. They highlight a "pri-
vate knowledge" the full details of which cannot be shared with clients,
and, at the same time, serve to shift responsibility for bad results from
lawyers to powerful and unapproachable legal authorities. The critique of
judges thus works to empower lawyers at the expense of their clients.
Many of these same themes are repeated when lawyers and clients dis-
cuss the behavior of other lawyers. In their most generous characteriza-
tions, lawyers describe other lawyers as "reasonable." Typical was the
comment of a California lawyer:
Yeah, you know, it's a problem. But, he has to deal with Joe Jordan
too and he has to deal with him on a personal basis and, you know,
he can change attorneys but Joe Jordan is a reasonable person. I'm
glad he chose him, frankly. Because there are other attorneys I
would rather he not have, you know, who would go ahead and tell
him to do these things. But I think Joe Jordan is reasonable and I
think if he can give him a lecture and really tell him about contempt
because if he does get caught or if he's got enough of these phone
52. These are the very characterizations of judges that, were they to be made public, might pro-
voke disciplinary action. See Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Heleringer, 602 S.W.2d 165 (Ky. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1101 (1981) (judge's decisions "highly unethical and grossly unfair"); In re Estes,
355 Mich. 411, 94 N.W.2d 916, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 829 (1959) (trial court said to have "violated
every rule in the books"); Nebraska State Bar v. Rhodes, 177 Neb. 650, 131 N.W.2d 118 (1964)
(court described as a "kangaroo court"); In re Hinds, 90 N.J. 604, 449 A.2d 483 (1982) (lawyer
characterized judge as racially biased); State Bar v. Semaan, 508 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974)
(judge called a "midget among giants").
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calls or calls at work where fellow workers see him too, or when he
comes to work.
Opposed to the reasonable lawyer is, among others, the "hypothetical
maniac." According to one California lawyer, such legal mania tempts all
lawyers, though only a few succumb:
And he may say, well what's a little leak in a roof, and then all of a
sudden if it gets out of hand you've got to go to a judge to determine
what a little leak in the roof is . . . . See, the real core of all these
things is you can become a hypothetical maniac as I call it. In law
school we used to laugh because there was always a guy in the back
who would raise his hand and said, Now what if the person was a
diabetic and crossed the street and a hemophiliac was coming left,
but the hemophiliac belonged to a club; and you sit in your chair
and think, my God, this guy's a maniac in the back row. Well unfor-
tunately the practice of law becomes, for two reasons, you are kind
of guarding yourself from malpractice and you are also thinking, my
God, the one time I don't alert somebody she's going to walk out the
door and it's going to happen. And it happens just enough to make
you real sensitive. So, what I think lawyers would be better off doing
is telling the client is probability scale. If there was some way of
telling them. Hopefully this won't be a problem, hopefully your roof
won't blow off.
In other cases, lawyers affirm and further unravel the dangers of deal-
ing with lawyers who are excessively preoccupied with "technical"
matters:
What your husband's lawyer has just done-it's a technical point
and I am absolutely right, okay; there's no issue on it; in fact, it's
never come up before because no one would ever question it-and
what they've done is, in the midst of negotiation, gone off to the side
and have your husband's lawyer telling him something which he
then tells you, which then would jeopardize any of this, which is just
kind of a fascinating way-instead of the lawyer saying, don't worry
about that now, or even. . . . In other words, the lawyer-your
husband's lawyer-didn't even have to tell him. It's nothing in
which he has decisions to make about.
The message is that clients are not well served by lawyers who alert them
to every possible eventuality no matter how remote.3 To do so only makes
53. This message provides a rhetorical justification for lawyer paternalism. See Wasserstrom,
Lawyers As Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HuM. RTs. 1 (1975). It also provides justification for
lawyers who withhold access to legal knowledge and, in so doing, reinforces the tendency of profes-
sionals to treat their expertise as a private possession. See J. KATz, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR
AND PATIENT (1984).
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negotiations more difficult and increases the probability of a contested
hearing.
Political agendas are also alleged to lead to unreasonable lawyer behav-
ior. The most commonly expressed criticism of this type targets "feminist"
lawyers:
Client: What's Claire's (wife's lawyer's) track record on these things
(willingness to reach negotiated settlements)? I mean, how does
she. . . What's her normal way of operating on these things?
Lawyer: What I know about Claire is that she can be very reasona-
ble. On the other hand, it is my opinion that her feminism has been
distorted in terms of how it relates to divorce law. Therefore, if
there's any rhetoric from your wife (about) what spousal support is
supposed to be, Claire will foster and cultivate that, rather than be
reality with her. . . . Claire is also an ardent feminist and often
confuses the issues of when to say enough is enough.
The distortion introduced by feminism encourages the wife to ask for
more spousal support; to "foster and cultivate" is to convert "rhetoric"
into concrete demands. The reasonable lawyer, on the other hand, sepa-
rates political belief from professional practice"' and knows when to say
"enough is enough."
Other lawyers are more direct in calling into question the professional-
ism, integrity, and ethics of their opponents. One of the most dramatic
instances of this occurred in a Massachusetts case in which the husband's
lawyer was repeatedly frustrated in his efforts to obtain discovery from his
client's wife:
Client: He said we'll produce these things in seventy-two hours.
Lawyer: He also defended her. Okay. . . he actually tried to make
arguments as to why they weren't answered . . . all of them, I as-
sure you, counterfeit as they could be. They were . . . there was
nothing of substance to those arguments and I found it most distaste-
ful. And I shouldn't be telling you this I suppose. The ordinary cli-
ent I wouldn't tell it to, but as far as I'm concerned his arguments
are quite distasteful to me as an attorney in my profession . ...
Later, the same lawyer laments that the actions of the other lawyer are
Incredible. . . . Whether he's just a plain pain in the ass, or
whether he, or whatever the reasons, you know. Whether they have
some sexual affinity, which I'm not even intimating, whether they
have a religious affinity, whether they just like each other, whether
he just wants to push his client's story whether he knows it's true or
not, whether he's irresponsible, whether he is someone who will cir-
54. Simon, supra note 14.
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cumvent the law and the rules to obtain any result that he can,
whether he doesn't even know what he's doing. Whatever the rea-
sons. The facts are that he's been doing what he's been doing...
and that's what we're dealing with, and I think it's a monster.
This lawyer employs powerful, but contradictory, rhetoric. He ac-
knowledges that lawyers should not criticize other lawyers and should
avoid mudslinging in general, yet he does both at length. He notes that his
adversary's motives are irrelevant to planning case strategy even as he
elaborates various interpretations of those motives. Nowhere does he con-
sider that the behavior which he finds so frustrating might arise from
responsible professional practice or from a well-intentioned effort to do
justice.
Such condemnation of other lawyers occurs frequently and tends to pro-
mote client cynicism. As a result, clients might increasingly perceive legal
professionals as insufficiently self-disciplined or as excessively self-
interested, or simply as insensitive and unethical. The legal process of di-
vorce is thus presented as a game where rules are abused and ignored by
major participants.
3. Justice and the Legal Order
What do lawyers say to clients about the efficiency, fairness, and social
utility of law in general, and about the legal process of divorce in particu-
lar? Again one begins by noting the relative absence of positive characteri-
zations. Lawyers, at least in the divorce context, do not defend the legal
order in which they participate as either the critics would predict or the
organized bar would prescribe. Instead, law talk suggests distance be-
tween lawyer and legal order, with the former portrayed as struggling
valiantly within the confines of a process that seems neither equitable nor
just.55 In numerous instances, moreover, lawyers suggest that their clients
are being "victimized" rather than being well-served by the legal process.
Here, the goal of law talk is to initiate the client into a jaded professional
world, disabused of the illusions of formalism.
Money, clients are advised, is the chief determinant of legal results.
Legal rights are "absolute" to the extent that clients "want to invest the
time, effort, energy and money" necessary to assert or defend them, but, at
the same time, clients are often advised that they cannot afford to do so.
As a result, lawyers suggest that clients should settle for less than the
client initially perceives as fair.56 As one Massachusetts lawyer explained
to a client in a hotly contested divorce in which the wife's wealthy family
was paying her lawyer:
55. A similar phenomenon is described in a study of the way members of Congress describe that
body to their constituents. R. FENNO, HOME STYLE 166-67 (1978).
56. See Sarat & Felstiner, Selling Settlement, supra note 39.
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I'm not just making this up. I'm telling you very frankly it appears
as though he's (the wife's lawyer) doing a $10,000 case. That's just
the way it is. Your-no matter who you go to-you can't afford a
$10,000 case. Can't do it. And that's part of the injustice of the
American legal system but I'm not going to do as much work as he is
at the moment. I can't . . . I'm just not equipped to do it. If you
were to give me $10,000 I would drop everything, drop everything,
and work 40 hours a week, but I can't based on what you can afford.
This lawyer attributes the "injustice" of the "American legal system" to
the law's inability to compensate for economic differences. At the same
time, he shifts responsibility for any possible failure from his own per-
formance to the client's limited means while he both suggests the wisdom
of putting more money into the case and disclaims an interest in having
the client do so.
Cost is not the only factor that lawyers point to in their critiques of the
legal order. Clients are also introduced to a system in which backlog and
delay are pervasive, where rights are eroded by wars of attrition carried
out over extended periods of time:
It is wearing and tearing. Just how much wear and tear can you
take. You've seen more than most divorce victims of how the courts
work. And so you should have a pretty good idea of what it's going
to be like. It's going to be dragged out . . . [aifter the trial, even if
you 'win', there's going to be a lot of stuff dragged out after that.
The repeated references to a "dragged out" process and to "wear and
tear" suggest that the pace of litigation is one of the factors that turn
litigants into "victims of how the courts work."
Courts are not the only objects of this criticism. The theme of the need-
less infliction of distress is found in a Massachusetts lawyer's evaluation
of the state legislature, which established a longer waiting period for no-
fault than for fault divorces:
They feel that if you go in and fight that's going to prevent people
from going through divorces. They're worried that if you make di-
vorce too easy everybody's going to go through divorce. I don't per-
sonally see it that way. I just don't see the need of putting people
through the anguish. It's a tough decision, but I think once people
make it they're going to stick with it . . . I don't think they're really
accomplishing what they think they are. They're causing more pain
than they should.
A costly, slow, and painful process might be justifiable if it were fair,
reliably protected important individual rights, or responded to important
human concerns. Law talk is, however, full of both lawyer and client
doubts about whether the legal process even aims at meeting those goals:
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Client: Sure. I mean, that's as much as can be expected, I believe.
Am I right in that?
Lawyer: I think so, too. I think that that effects a good settlement.
Well, it effects an equal division. I don't know-is a legal settlement,
a fair settlement? It gets the legal aspects of the case over.
Here the lawyer notes that a "legal settlement" entails an "equal divi-
sion" while questioning whether such a result, or a settlement that deals
only with the "legal aspects of the case," is "fair."
This exchange represents another example of the discourse in which
lawyers teach clients about the distance between law and society, not just
because of the limited efficacy of legal rules, but because of the law's
tightly limited concerns. This indoctrination is especially important be-
cause there is frequently a clash between the client's ultimate objectives
and the lawyer's description of what the law can actually do; typically, the
client's agenda is broader than the law's alleged competence. Lawyers
readily point out the limited nature of legal justice:
Client: Well, I mean, I'm a liberal. Right? A liberal dream is that
you will find social justice, and so here was this statement that it was
possible to fight injustice, and you were going to protect me from
horrible things like judicial abuse. So that's uh, it was really
nice. . . . But as you say, if you want justice in this society, you
look somewhere other than the court. I believe that's what you were
saying to Bob.
Lawyer: Yeah, that's what I said. Ultimate justice, that is.
Juxtaposing legal and "ultimate" justice, this California lawyer implies
that any person seeking such a final accounting is clearly not going to be
fully satisfied by a system with more narrow concerns. Law talk encour-
ages clients to come to terms with this reality by lowering their expecta-
tions and by implicitly directing them to look elsewhere for consolation.
III. FROM LEGAL REALISM TO PROFESSIONAL SELF-DEFENSE
The common conversational practice of debunking formalism and eq-
uity, thereby flattening the ideals of legal justice and fairness, would seem
to call into question the very role and authority of divorce lawyers them-
selves. As clients learn that rules are not central to the divorce process,
sooner or later it must dawn on them that the purported technical exper-
tise of lawyers, their presumably sophisticated knowledge of rules, are re-
ally only of limited value. Yet, since law talk proceeds by increasingly
relegating rules to the background, and by stressing instead the peculiar
57. This is not a problem limited to divorce. See Mather & Yngvesson, Language, Audience and
the Transformation of Disputes, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 775 (1980-81).
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patterns of individual legal actors, it prepares the way for an alternative
defense of professional power: one based not on rules but on local knowl-
edge, insider access, connections, and reputation.58 Lawyers often suggest
that their most important contribution is knowledge of the ropes, not
knowledge of the rules;59 they describe a system that is not bureaucrati-
cally rational but is, nonetheless, accessible to its "priests." One illustra-
tion is provided by a California case in which the client presses her law-
yer for some explanation of why a restraining order was issued against
her, an order issued before she became a client of the lawyer with whom
she is now conferring:
Client: How often does a case like this come along-a restraining
order of this nature?
Lawyer: Very common. . . . Yeah, you know, I talked, I did talk to
someone in the know-I won't go any further than that-who said
that this one could have been signed purely by accident. I mean, that
the judge could have-if he looked at it now-said, I would not sign
that, knowing what it was, and it could have been signed by acci-
dent, and I said, well, then how does that happen? And he said,
well, you've all this stuff going; you come back to your office, and
there's a stack of documents that need signatures. He says, you can
do one or two things: you can postpone signing them until you have
time but then it may be the end of the day; the clerk's office is clos-
ing, and people who really need this stuff aren't going to get the
order, because there's someone else that needs your attention, so you
go through them, and one of the main things you look for is the law
firm or lawyer who is proposing them. And you tend to rely on
them.
Two themes weave their way through these comments. First, this
description of how judges handle court orders suggests a high level of rou-
tinization and inattention. Judges sign orders without reference to their
legal merit or to their substantive effects, but simply to satisfy "people
who really need this stuff." Second, the lawyer emphasizes the importance
of insider status and reputation. While judges are said to ignore the sub-
stance of orders, they do pay attention to the identity of the lawyer or firm
requesting them. Presumably, repeat players, those known to be reliable,
get their orders signed, while others do not.60 This use of reputation is
58. Blumberg, The Practice of Law As a Confidence Game, 1 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 15 (1967).
59. This emphasis on connection and reputation as the key service provided by lawyers is not
unusual where a lawyer's practice tends to be confined to a single geographic area. See J. CARLIN,
LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN (1962); London, Clients, Colleagues and Community, 1985 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 81; Nelson, Reconsidering the Obvious: Lawyers and the Structure of Influence in
Washington (1986) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors); Sarat, Ideologies of Professional-
ism: Conflict and Change Among Small Town Lawyers (1988) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with authors).
60. For a general discussion of the advantage of being a repeat player, see Galanter, Why the
'Haves' Come Out Ahead, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 95 (1974).
1989] 1685
The Yale Law Journal
redoubled in its rhetorical power by the explanation of how this lawyer
obtained his information. His reference to talking to "someone in the
know" suggests that he himself is an insider, trusted enough to be the
recipient of confidential information. Moreover, by refusing to say who
gave him the information ("I won't go any further than that"), he simul-
taneously arouses curiosity and implies that his informant has committed
an impropriety. Combined with the earlier reference to "accident" as an
explanation for why this order was signed, this talk hardly inspires client
confidence in the legal process.61
Lawyers frequently go to great lengths to impress clients with their
range of contacts and importance on the local legal scene. Such references
take many different forms. One Massachusetts lawyer, trying to reassure
his client in a difficult case, noted:
By the way, the judge has been appointing me on all the guardian-
ship and guardian ad litum cases up here where an attorney is
needed from out of town. So maybe that is a sign that he likes me.
And maybe that's a sign that he's inclined your way anyway.
Other references to the importance of reputation are even more blatant:
Now I think I have a good reputation with the registrar of probate
here. Judge Murdoch is married to, no, what am I saying, Judge
Murdoch's sister is married to Bob's wife. My God, try again. His
sister is Bob's wife. Okay. They talk all the time. Bob likes me very,
very much. We get along very, very well. And I have a good reputa-
tion in this court and I think it's going to get through to the Judge.
It is not reputation in some general sense that counts, but reputation
"in this court." This specificity typifies law talk in the divorce lawyer's
office; that talk is laced with references to how things are done in particu-
lar courts and with comparisons suggesting that no two courts (or even no
two judges) operate in the same way. The legal system, thus portrayed, is
localized, governed by peculiar and specific practices rather than by uni-
versal norms and therefore requires extensive familiarity with the local
scene. Both the unrepresented client and the inexperienced lawyer are pic-
tured as being at a real disadvantage.
At the same time that they create doubts about the legal process, divorce
lawyers give clients reasons to rely on them by emphasizing the impor-
tance of their insider status. In this posture, the interests of the profes-
61. A public suggestion of judicial favoritism or an alleged pattern of undue influence has fre-
quently subjected lawyers to disciplinary proceedings. Compare the quoted material with the state-
ment by defendant attorney Nelson that, "The courts are . . . much more concerned with who ap-
pears before them than with what the facts are and what the law is." State v. Nelson, 210 Kan. 637,
504 P.2d 211 (1972); see also Ramirez v. State Bar of California, 28 Cal. 3d 402, 619 P.2d. 399, 169
Cal. Rptr. 206, (1980).
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sional depart from those of the legal system. Lawyers construct a picture
of the legal process which creates individualized client dependency while it
jeopardizes trust in the legal system and may damage the legitimacy of the
legal order.
IV. CONCLUSION
In a legal order whose legitimacy rests on the claims of formalism and,
to a lesser extent, on those of equity, the law talk of the divorce lawyer's
office may be partially responsible for the common finding that people
who use legal processes tend, no matter how favorable the results of their
encounter, to have a less positive view of the law than those with no direct
experience.62 Law talk in the divorce lawyer's office, as it interprets the
internal workings of the legal system, exposes law as failing to live up to
the, expectations which people have about it. The law talk of the divorce
lawyer's office is replete with "rule skepticism." 63 Moreover, while it ac-
knowledges the importance of discretion, and of the particular proclivities
of the actors who exercise it, it is highly critical of their motivations, ca-
pacities, commitments, and concerns. If the presentation of a formalist
front, or of a legal system whose officials are fully committed to doing
substantive justice, is necessary to legitimate the legal order, then the pres-
entation of the legal process at the street level may work to unwind the
bases of legitimation that other levels work to create.6
Given the absence of research similar to our own, it is difficult to say
whether the discourse of the lawyers we observed is characteristic of other
settings or areas of legal practice. However, some similar themes have
been reported elsewhere. We know, for example, that an emphasis on per-
sonal contacts, local knowledge, and reputation is often part of the trans-
action between lawyers and clients in criminal cases.65 In that context
lawyers stress their connections to, and reputation with, local prosecutors
as they try to "sell" plea bargains to their clients. In contexts other than
divorce or criminal prosecution, where law is more rule-intensive, it may
be that lawyers talk to their clients about the discretion that an oversupply
of rules makes available to legal officials. 6 Moreover, in any context
where clients are sophisticated users of legal services, have frequent deal-
ings with legal officials, or operate in bureaucratic environments, such
cynical interpretations may have less impact than they have on divorce
clients.
62. Sarat, supra note 12.
63. See J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1949).
64. Merry, supra note 12.
65. See Blumberg, supra note 58; see also L. MATHER, supra note 46.
66. The "availability of law" has been documented by Silbey and Bitner, but their description
does not extend to the way that the consequences of that phenomenon are explained to laypeople. See
Silbey & Bitner, The Availability of Law, 4 LAW & POL'Y Q. 399 (1982).
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Nevertheless, if mass legal consciousness has, in fact, taken a turn to-
ward cynical instrumentalism, the pattern of practice that we observed in
the divorce context may be a contributing factor. On the other hand, if the
American public is mystified by the pretenses of legal formalism and is, as
a result, allegiant, it remains so in spite of the law talk of the divorce
lawyer's office. But, no matter what its impact, law talk suggests that
divorce lawyers, at least, do not take seriously the professional obligation
to "maintain due respect for courts of justice and judicial officers."67 In-
deed, while critical scholars are devoted to proving the proposition that
legal rules are indeterminate and to enlisting practicing professionals in
the project of demystifying and exposing the claims of legal formalism,
68
divorce lawyers seem routinely to be engaged in this same project as they
counsel clients.69 Yet there is no evidence that the demystification that
accompanies lawyers' cynical characterizations of law has led, as the crit-
ics would hope, to a reorientation of professional practice or to the elimi-
nation of the perceived boundary between law and politics.
67. Ramirez v. State Bar of California, 28 Cal. 3d at 408 n.12, 619 P.2d at 405 n.12, 169 Cal.
Rptr. at 212 n.12.
68. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984).
69. Critical scholars would not, however, be content with the way in which the unmasking of law
is used to maintain client dependency and reinforce professional power. See Simon, supra note 14.
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